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COMMENTS
COMMENTAIRES
LABOUR LAW-SECONDARY PICKETING-PER SE ILLEGALITY-
PUBLIC POLICY:-The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently can-
vassed the tort law of picketing for the first time since the 1930's,l
having during that period only rarely touched upon the whole field
of labour torts.2 Unlike RipVan Winkle whowoke from his twenty-
year slumber to a strange new world, the Court of Appeal appears
to have found matters very much as it left them : picketing is
tortious .
In Hersees of Woodstock v. Goldstein' the court was faced
squarely with the issue of the legality of secondary picketing in-
tended to procure a consumer boycott. Employees of Deacon
Brothers Sportswear Ltd. in Belleville, Ontario, were organized by
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. Following certi-
fication the union attempted, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a collec-
tive agreement on their behalf After exhausting the conciliation
procedures required by law the union was free to call a strike, but
chose instead to engage in an "educational campaign" designed to
persuade potential purchasers of Deacon products to divert their
custom to goods manufactured under union working conditions,
as evidenced, by a "union label". The defendants, union officers,
approached retailers to enlist their support in ceasing to deal in
Deacon products. Hersees, a menswear store in Woodstock, On-
tario, refused, andtwo pickets appeared in front of Hersees bearing
placards which read :
ATTENTION SHOPPERS
DEACON BROS. SPORTSWEAR LTD.
sold at
HERSEES
made by NON-UNION LABOUR
Protect your own standard of living,
look for the Amalgamated
Union Label when you buy men's and
boy's apparel
3 Dallas v. Felek, [1934] O.W.N . 247 (C.A.), was the last reported in-
stance .
2 Fokuhl v. Raymond, [1949] O.R . 704; Newell v. Barker, [1949] O.R .
85 ; Body v. Murdoch, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 326.a [196312 O.R. 81 (C.A.), rev'g. [1963] 1 O.R. 36.
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The reverse of the placard bore the legend : "The Woodstock-
Ingersoll & District Labour Council Supports this Campaign",
together with a list of ten local unions . There was no allegation of
violence, of threats or of the commission of any nominate tort ;
no employees of Hersees ceased work. On these facts McRuer
C.J.H.C . had held the picketing lawful . The Court of Appeal
unanimously reversed.
On the facts as found by McRuer C.J.H.C ., (i) the plaintiff
failed to prove a conspiracy to induce a breach of his contract with
Deacon Bros. ; 4 (ii) the plaintiff failed to prove a conspiracy to
injure the plaintiff in his trade by establishing a picket line which
some customers of the plaintiff would not cross,' (iii) the plaintiff
failed to establish nuisance .' The first and second of these findings
of fact were rejected by the Court of Appeal . Finally, as a matter
of law, McRuer C.J.H.C. enunciated an analysis of the picketing
which was also rejected in the higher court :
The defendants were exercising a common law right to peacefully
communicate information by causing a man to carry a placard with a
simple statement of fact on it and an implied invitation to those in
sympathy with organized labour to buy only goods bearing the union
label .?
The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, held secondary picket-
ing to be illegal per se .
An understanding of the Court of Appeal's position requires an
analysis of each of the points of difference between that court and
the court below. Following as it does so closely upon the thorough
discussion of the law of secondary picketing by Professor Car-
rothers,' this comment will be confined to the issues raised by the
Hersees decision rather than to a systematic survey of the entire
area .
(i) Inducing Breach of Contract.
As has been noted, McRuer C.J.H.C . found that no contract
existed between Deacon and Hersees.' On a close analysis of the
a "There is no material on which I could find such a conspiracy. The
plaintiff had no contract with the Deacon Company." [1963] 1 O.R. 36,
at p . 38 .
s "In fact the evidence is quite conclusive that there was no combination
motivated by an intention to injure the plaintiff." Ibid., at p . 39 .
s "On the facts of this case it is not shown that the defendants did
anything amounting to an actionable nuisance." Ibid.
7 Ibid.
Carrothers, Secondary Picketing (1962), 40 Can . Bar Rev . 57 . This
excellent article was not referred to by the court, and few of the Canadian
decisions therein mentioned were discussed.
0 Supra, footnote 4 .
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evidence, Aylesworth J.A. (with the concurrence of MacKay and
McGillivray JJ.A.) found that such a contract did exist, that the
defendants "acting individually at least" sought to induce Hersees
to break it, andthat "the chief, if not only purpose of the subsequent
picketing, was to force appellant's hand in this respect" .1°No doubt
because the only material before the appellate court consisted of
affidavit evidence, that court was not hesitant in reversing the trial'
judge's findings of fact," although it should be noted in passing
that the language of Hersee's affidavit stopped short of an allega-
tion that an actual contract existed.12
Even assuming the existence of a contract between Hersees and
Deacon Bros., Aylesworth J.A.'s technique of imposing liability
requires scrutiny . The often-cited 13 formula enunciated by Viscount
Simon in the Crofter case affords a convenient point of departure :
If C has an existing contract with A and B is aware of it and if B
persuades or induces C to break the contract with resulting damage
to A, this is, generally speaking, a tortious act for which B will be liable
to A for the injury he has done him. In some cases, however, B may be
able to justify his procuring of the breach of contract. 14
First, andmost obviously, Aylesworth J.A . has committed aserious
error in "judicial algebra"." If "C", in the instant case, is Hersees,
"B" is Goldstein, the defendant, and "A" is Deacon Bros . B
(Goldstein) is thus liable not to C (Hersees) but rather to A
(Deacon), if to anyone . Aylesworth J.A.'s reasoning, on this limb
of the case, would have had the effect of having given Johanna
Wagner a cause of action in Lumley v. Gye 16 because she yielded
to the blandishments of Gye. No case of which I am aware gives
the contract breaker a cause of action merely because the defendant
has induced or persuaded him to break a contract; it is rather the
10 [1963] 2 O.R. 81, at p . 84.
11 Cf. Donnelly v . Chittick (1953), 31 M.P.R. 240 (N.B.C.A.), where
the trial judgment was based on the reading of a transcript .
12 Paragraph 3 of the affidavit of William Hersee, manager of the plain-
tiff company, reads as follows : " . . . Mr. Clair [a defendant union official]
asked if our firm did business with Deacon Brothers Limited of Belleville
to which I replied that we did . Clair then asked me to cancel any orders
we had with Deacon Brothers Limited because Deacon Brothers Limited
was not co-operating with a branch ofthe Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America (C.L.C.) . At the time he made the request ourfirm had no orders
with Deacon Brothers Limited ofBelleville. Clair said that if we did not so
co-operate he would arrange to picket our store . I did not accede to his
suggestion." (emphasis added.)
11 See e.g . Thomson v . Deakin, [1952] 1 Ch . 646, at pp . 682, 691 ; Smith
Brothers. v. Jones, [1955] O.R. 362, at p. 369. Aylesworth J.A. relied on
Smith Brothers v. Jones, see supra, footnote 10, at p. 85 .
14 Crofter v. Yeitch, [1942] A.C . 435, at p . 442 (H.L.) .is Ibid., per Viscount Simon L.C., at p . 446.
11 (1853), 2 E . & B . 216, 118 E.R . 749 (Q.B .) .
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innocent party to the contract who may then sue. On the other
hand, if the defendant has, by the exertion of illegal pressures,
forced (rather than induced) the plaintiff to break a contract, then
the basis of relief is the tortious nature of those pressures and not
"inducing breach of contract". In such circumstances, loss of
contractual benefits is merely an item in the calculation of damages.
In Hersees, however, there was no allegation that the picketing
involved any tortious acts such as assault, intimidation or defama-
tion upon which to found liability.
Moreover, Aylesworth J.A . stops short of an express finding
that Hersees was actually forced to breach the contract with Deacon
in the sense envisaged in the leading case of Thomson v. Deakin :
Thus if X, with knowledge and intention, forced A to break his contract
with B by depriving A of his only possible means of performing the
contract (as for example by removing the only available essential tools
or by kidnapping a necessary or irreplaceable servant or by persuading
a necessary and irreplaceable servant to break his contract) then
probably in such cases the liability of X could be proved . 17
In Hersees the picketing undoubtedly had the effect of bringing
some economic pressure to bear upon Hersees to cease dealing in
Deacon merchandise. The placards were intended to persuade
customers not to buy goods without the union label rather than
to cease to deal with Hersees generally although, as Aylesworth
J.A . pointed out, the visual impact of the placards might create
in the careless observer the impression that Hersees itself was under
attack. The real legal significance of the picketing, however, stems
from "judicial notice" that a picket line is so effective to bring
pressure to bear upon Hersees that it would have to yield to the
union's demands and break its contract with Deacon .
In this day and age the power and influence of organized labour is
very far indeed from negligible . "Loyalty to the picket line" is a credo
influencing a large portion of any community such as the City of Wood-
stock with its own District Labour Council and numerous member
unions ; nor does the matter rest there, for doubtless to many private
citizens not directly interested in the labour movement the presence of
pickets before business premises is a powerful deterrent to doing busi-
ness at those premises . . . . 18
But even assuming that every prospective customer of Hersees was
so careless as to misread the placard, was either so sympathetic
17 Supra, footnote 13, at p . 702.
18 Supra, footnote 10, at p . 85 . In fact, organized labour in Woodstock
and vicinity does represent about ten per cent of the population. The
Woodstock and District Labour Council represents some 3,500 organized
workers (O.F.L. figures) in a population of 34,541 in the three towns
within itsjurisdiction, Woodstock, Ingersoll and Tillsonburg (1961 census) .
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or so timid as to respect the picket line unthinkingly, is this the
sort of pressure referred to in Thomson v. Deakin ? It, would seem,
rather, that to attract liability under the test of that case the de-
fendant must have made performance of the contract physically
impossible . Merely putting one of the parties to economic loss
would not seem to suffice . Thus, Evershed M.R. stated that a de-
fendant who deliberately purchased all the goods ofthe type which
A was to sell to B so that A could not perform was not acting
tortiously.i9 If, instead, the defendant persuaded all potential sellers
ofthe goods not to sell to A, he likewise would prevent performance
of the contract but, would not be liable to B. Similarly, if the union
persuaded the public to cease buying Deacon products whereby
the disappearance of Hersees' retail market renders' impossible (or,
at least, unprofitable) performance of an agreement to order goods
from Deacon, no liability should attach. That pressures, not in
themselves unlawful, can lawfully be brought to bear upon one
party to a business relationship with the intention of injuring the
other seems clear from high Canadian authority as well. 2 ° There
was (on this limb of the case) no allegation and no finding that an
appeal to the public to withhold custom was in itself illegal means
employed to interfere with the relationship between Deacon and
Hersees . Such a finding, of course, would place a bar sinister on
every- picket sign and make even primary picketing unlawful .
Finally, Aylesworth J.A . completely ignores the issue ofjustifi-
cation alluded to in the Crofter case by Viscount Simon. The tradi-
tional reluctance of the courts to find justification for inducing
breach of contract" does not excuse a complete failure, to advert
to the problem. Whether, on the facts of the instant case, justifica-
tion existed can best be discussed under the head of conspiracy to
injure .
(ji) Conspiracy to Injure.
McRuer C.J.H.C . had held :
The evidence does not establish that there was "a predominant motive
in the minds" of the defendants to injure the plaintiff as distinct from
the "main object of benefiting themselves" by seeking to advance the
interests of their trade union (Crofter case, p . 436) . In fact the evidence
is quite conclusive that there was no combination motivated by an
intention to injure the plaintiff. 22
is Supra, footnote 13, at p . 680 .
21 Newell v . Barker, [19501 S.C.R . 385 .
21 See Arthurs, Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada (1960), 38 Can.
Bar Rev. 346, at p. 375 et seq . ; Carrothers, Secondary Picketing, op . cit.,
footnote 8, at p . 66.
22 Supra, footnote 4, at p. 39 .
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While Aylesworth J.A . (with whom McGillvray J.A. concurred)
declined to disturb this finding, MacKay J.A . expressly held that
"the actions of the defendants in this case constituted an unlawful
conspiracy to injure the plaintiff in his trade"." MacKay J.A.
believed, no doubt accurately, that although the defendants might
properly have sought to persuade Hersees to sever relations with
Deacon, the act of picketing was intended as a reprisal for Hersees'
failure to do so . Citing Viscount Simon's definition of conspiracy
to injure in Crofter" he was unable to discern in the union's
conduct any legitimate self-interest:
I find it difficult to see any benefit to the employees of Deacon Brothers
in the dissemination of information to the public in the City of Wood-
stock and, in any case, if that could be said to be the object of the picket-
ing, such object could have been accomplished much more effectively
than by having pickets march up and down a small section of the street
in front of the plaintiff's place of business . 26
He therefore concluded that the defendants' motive was to injure
the plaintiff. As a matter of law the learned judge's approach seems
to be framed as a direct confrontation of Viscount Simon who had
said,
([It is not for a court of law to consider in this connection the expediency
or otherwise of a policy adopted by a trade union.25
MacKay J.A. then approached the question on the basis that
even if secondary picketing might be justified as furthering the
interests of Deacon employees,
I think the situation here is somewhat analogous to the rule followed
by the courts in cases where relevant evidence which is of small pro-
bative value to the one party, and is greatly prejudicial to the other
party, is excluded in the interests of justice and fairness . . . . [I]n my
view, the benefit to the employees of Deacon Brothers would be
negligible compared to the harm that would be done to the plaintiff in
its business.27
Viscount Simon, as if with some premonition of MacKay J.A.'s
judgment, rejoins:
Neither can liability be determined by asking whether the damage
inflicted to secure the purpose is disproportionately severe : this may
throw doubts on the bona fides of the avowed purpose, but once the
23 Supra, footnote 10, at p. 88 .
21 Supra, footnote 14, at p. 443 : "If . . . the real purpose of the combina-
tion is the inflicting of damage on A as distinguished from serving the
bona fide and legitimate interests of those who so combine, then if damage
results to A, the act is tortious ."
25 Supra, footnote 10, at p . 89 .
95 Supra, footnote 14, at p . 447 ; see also Lord Wright, at p. 472 .
27 Supra, footnote 10, at p . 90.
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legitimate purpose is established, and no unlawful means are involved,
the quantum of damage is irrelevant ."
This imagined judicial dialogue across space andtime merely serves
to focus attention on the potential divergence ofjudicial approaches
which makes the common law a poor substitute for legislation in
the regulation of labour controversy.29
Conspiracies are tortious if they inflict damage upon the plain-
tiff by unlawful means or for an unlawful purpose. In view of his
reliance upon the illegality of the defendants' purposes rather than
means, MacKay J.A. is obliged to answer the same question that
Aylesworth J.A. neglected to pose in dealing with inducing breach
of contract: is the defendants' conduct justified?
While traditionally justification in inducing breach cases has
been narrowly circumscribed, the opposite is true of conspiracy.
As Lord Wright stated in Crofter :
English law . . . has for better or worse adopted the test of self-interest
or selfishness as being capable of justifying the deliberate doing of
unlawful acts which inflict harm, so long as the means employed are
not wrongful.3o
In Hersees the union's "predominant" purpose" vis-à.-vis the neu-
tral retailer was to procure a rupture of his relationship with the
primary employer, Deacon, and thereby to pressure Deacon into
making concessions in collective bargaining . This tactic, it must be
remembered, was employed by the union as asubstitute for a strike.
Collective bargaining demands, then, rather than spite motivated
the union's action; collective bargaining is the cornerstone of our
labour legislation . In concluding, as he does, that the union's pur-
pose is unlawful MacKay J.A . fails to apply to the purpose limb
of conspiracy the statutory yardstick whichthe courts have develop-
ed in evaluating the legality of means." Surely liability for con-
spiracy, if any, would have been more securely founded had the
union's means rather than its purposes been proscribed.
(iii) Nuisance .
Neither Aylesworth nor MacKay JJ.A . disturbed the trial judg-
ment insofar as it related to nuisance . Williams v. Aristocratic
Restaurants" appears to be tacitly accepted as signalling the end
23 Supra, footnote 14, at p. 447 .
11 See Arthurs, op. cit ., footnote 21, at p . 391 et seq ., and Carrothers,
op . cit ., footnote 8, at p . 75 et seq .
10 Supra, footnote 14, at P. 472.31 Ibid., at p. 478 .
32 See e .g . Therien v. Teamsters, [1960] S.C.R . 265 ; Gagnon v . Foundation
Maritime, [1961] S.C.R . 435 .
11 [19511 S.C.R . 762. McRuer C.J.H.C . referred explicitly to the state-
580
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . XLl
ofjudicial treatment of picketing as nuisance per se, and as focusing
attention on a factual evaluation of the conduct in each case. While
the recent British Columbia decision in Zellers' v. Retail Food
Drug Clerks Union" may herald the renewal ofjudicial preoccupa-
tion with the landowner's interests as opposed to an evaluation of
labour conduct, Hersees at least does not rest on this narrow
premise.
(iv) Picketing, Public Policy andPer Se Illegality.
The real significance of Hersees v. Goldstein lies not in the
analysis of the traditional tort doctrines, but rather in the bald
assertion by Aylesworth J.A. that secondary picketing is "illegal
per se".as In what can only be described as a leap offaith from social
premise to legal result Aylesworth J.A . makes an extraordinary
pronouncement :
But even assuming that the picketing carried on by the respondents
was lawful in the sense that it was merely peaceful picketing for the
purpose only of communicating information, I think it should be re-
strained . Appellant has a right lawfully to engage in its business of
retailing merchandise to the public. In the City of Woodstock where
that business is being carried on, the picketing for the reasons already
stated, has caused or is likely to cause damage to the appellant . There-
fore, the right, if there be such right, of the respondents to engage in
secondary picketing of appellant's premises must give way to appellant's
right to trade . . . .36
There can seldom have been judicial language so pregnant with
meaning as the word "therefore" which propels the learned judge
across the chasm which yawns between premise and result . To
bridge this chasm, he tenders two, interrelated, lines of exegesis
upon his basic text "therefore" .
First, he notes, that the union's right to engage in secondary
picketing,
. . . assuming it to be a legal right, is exercised for the benefit of a
particular class only while [Hersees'] is a right far more fundamental
and of far greater importance, in my view, as one which in its exercise
went of Kerwin C.J.C . at p. 780: "Picketing is a form of watching and
besetting but that still leaves for decision in each case, what amounts to a
nuisance ." See also Nipissing Hotel v. Hotel etc . Employees Union (1963),
38 D.L.R. (2d) 675 (Ont .) .
34 (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 581 (B.C.C.A .) . Picketing of a retail merchant
in a shopping centre was enjoined as an interference with the easement
enjoyed by the plaintiff and its customers, to pass over a parking lot and
passageway owned by the landlord and used by all merchants in the
shopping centre .
as Supra, footnote 10, at p. 88.
11 Ibid., at p. 86 (italics added) . MacKay J.A. makes a virtually identical
statement at p. 90 in his discussion of conspiracy .
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affects and is for the benefit of the community at large . If the law is
to serve its purpose then in civil matters just as in matters within the
realm of the criminal law, the interests of the community at large must
be held to transcend those of the individual or a particular group of
individuals.3r
This passage in turn poses a host of problems : is the communica-
tion of information or the exercise of the right of "free speech"
through picketing in the interest only of the speaker -or as well
in the interest of the public to whom the message is addressed?
If, as Aylesworth J.A. noted," picketing will cause members of
the public to withdraw or withhold custom, is this not evidence
that the public desires to be and is entitled to be apprised of the
existence of a labour controversy? On the other hand, I3ersees'
commercial success does not necessarily coincide with "tithe inter-
ests-of the community at large" ; 19 so long as menswear can easily
be purchased elsewhere the community may be quite indifferent to.
Hersees' very existence. Finally, the notion that individual and
group interests must always yield to community interest is an
affirmation of totalitarian philosophy quite inconsistent with con-
stitutional government : the protection of minorities and dissenters
notwithstanding the community discomfort they engender is a
cherished tradition." With respect, Aylesworth J.A. does not begin
to address himself to any ofthese questions, which may be a serious
omission in view of the fact that the statement quoted seems to be
equally applicable to secondary and primary picketing. This con-
sideration apart, the use of the word "therefore" to suggest that
there is a self-evident solution to these highly controversial issues
can hardly be justified.
Secondly, Aylesworth J.A. cites a number of cases 41 which-
although based upon "admittedly unlawful elements such as tres-
pass, intimidation, nuisance or inducement of breach of contract"
-yield evidence of "a trend toward if not a positive statement of
the principle" that secondary picketing is unlawful per se. 4a He
3' Ibid., at p . 86 . 33 See supra, footnote 10, at p. 85 .
3B Aylesworth J.A ., in all fairness, is not alone in identifying a particular
business interest with the welfare of a community. Cf. the classic statement
of Charles E . Wilson, former United States Secretary of Defense : "What's
good for General Motors is good for the nation."
11 See e.g . Boucher v . The King, [1951] S.C.R . 265 ; Saumur v. Quebec,
[1953] 2 S.C.R . 299 .
11 General Dry Batteries v . Brigenshaw, [1951] O.R. 522 ; Pacific Western
Planing Mills v . I.W.A ., [1955] 1 D.L.R . 652 ; Patchett v . P.G.E., [1959]
S.C.R. 271 ; I.L. & W. U. v. Pacific Coast Terminals (1959), 21 D.L.R . (2d)
249 ; Dusessoy's Supermarkets v . Retail Clerks Union (1961), 30 D.L.R.
(2d) 51 .
42 Supra, footnote 10, at p . 87 .
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places particular emphasis upon Patchett v . Pacific Great Eastern
Railtiva}, 43 where the Supreme Court of Canada declined to hold a
railway liable for its failure to provide railway services to the
plaintiff. The failure was attributable to the existence of a secondary
picketline on plaintiff's private rail siding which the train crew
declined to cross . Because of the tortious conduct of the pickets
(including illegal trespass on the plaintiffshipper's premises) the
court was obviously justified in assuming that the picketing was
illegal apart from the issue of secondary pressure : it would equally
have been illegal had it been primary picketing . Nonetheless
Aylesworth J.A . states :
. . . these condemnations of the secondary picketing as being illegal
do not appear in a context which suggests that they are based upon the
inclusion in the picketing of the extrinsic unlawful elements . . . and
I view them as declaring secondary picketing to be illegal per se.+s
Since the basis of the judgment was the failure of the plaintiff
shipper to furnish the defendant-railway "reasonable means of
access" 11 by removing the trespassing pickets from its rail siding,
the case can hardly be viewed as authority for the broad proposition
for which Aylesworth J.A. cites it .
As for the other cases cited -and several others not cited 4 ^ -
they do in fact evidence unanimous judicial antipathy to secondary
pressures . Squarely put, the question then arises as to whether
there is such a thing as per se illegality in the absence of any of the
specific torts upon which each of those earlier cases rested . The
conclusion on this limb of the learned judge's reasoning is that
because other judges have always proscribed secondary picketing
on the particular facts before them, "therefore" all secondary
picketing is always unlawful . Quaere whether judicial antipathy
outlaws conduct not otherwise unlawful?
Picketing to procure a consumer boycott is a traditional tactic
which has been employed as a sanction by a variety of non-labour
groups engaged in arousing public opinion for social, political,
religious or economic ends. 47 The Hersees judgments do not appear
43 Supra, footnote 41 . 44 Supra, footnote 10, at p . 88 .
4b Patchett v . P.G.E., supra, footnote 41, at p . 277, per Rand J. The
learned judge concluded his reasons for judgment by stating : "It should
not be necessary, but to prevent any misconception of implication from
these reasons, I add this : the only question dealt with is the duty of the
railway toward the company in the precise situation presented." ibid.,
at p . 278 .
4e Verdun Printing v . L'Union Internationale des Clicheurs, [1957] Que.
S.C. 204 ; Sauvé Freres v . Amalgamated Clothing Workers, [1959] Que.
S.C. 341 ; Bourrassa v . U.P. W.A ., [1961] Que . S.C . 604 ; Coles Bakery v .
Bakery etc. Workers (1962), 36 D.L.R . (2d) 772 (B.C.S.C .) .
47 Comment, Use of Economic Sanctions by Private Groups (1962), 30
19631
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to draw a line between the act of picketing and that of boycotting" ,
and may conceivably be read as forbidding both . So to hold would
not merely forbid labour unions to engage in activity frequently
practised by other groups, but would also outlaw a tactic which
was sanctioned in one of the earliest labour cases to come before
the Ontario courts .
Schrader v. Lillis1 49ironically, involved almost the exact converse
of the Hersees dispute. In that case members of an association of
cigar manufacturers had instituted a defensive boycott, andentered
into an agreement to refrain from handling goods which bore a
union label, and to refuse to run "union shops" ; the purpose of
this boycott was to bring striking cigar workers to terms. Upon
breach of this agreement by one of their number, the remaining
employers sued to recover the penalty provided . The defendant
unsuccessfully pleaded that such boycotts were agreements in re-
straint of trade and consequently unenforceable as contrary to
public policy. In rejecting this argument Proudfoot J. viewed the
situation differently than did the court in Hersees . Instead of merely
stating that trade was in the public interest and that any limitation
on trade was necessarily illegal, he noted :
If the manufacture of cigars be a matter of public benefit, a trade in
which the public are interested, this agreement does not interfere with
it, except so far as the small portion of the public comprising the
[unionized] cigar makers are concerned, and they cannot complain,
for they are themselves the cause of the difficulty . And even with regard
to them they will not be deprived of the enjoyment of a cheap luxury,
as there are other manufacturers who employ only union men and use
union labels, so that the public interest would not appear to be in-
juriously affected by the agreement."'
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the approach of Proudfoot J. also
leaves much to be desired in the context of contemporary labour
relations. Today when the legislature has not forbidden boycotts
and the parties are engaged in "subsidiary action not incompatible
with express provisions" 11 of the Labour Relations Act, the judicial
U. of Chi . L . Rev . 171 ; Comment, Legal Responsibility for Extra-Legal
Censure (1962), 62 Col. L . Rev . 475 .
48 In Jacobsen v. Anderson (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 746 (N.S.C.A.) thecourt similarly refused to draw the line between the act of picketing andthat of striking. However, in the Jacobsen case it was the strike and notthe picketing which was illegal, being in contravention of the provincial
labour relations legislation.
49 (1886), 10 O.R . 358 ."' Ibid., at pp . 366-367 .
"1 Williams v . Aristocratic Restaurants, supra, footnote 33, per Rand J .,at p. 787 ; appv'd . Nipissing Hotel v . Hotel etc., Employees Union, supra,
footnote 33, per Spence J ., at p. 693 .
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function is surely not to create a new code of industrial warfare.
More especially where the legislature has, at least inferentially,
drawn the line between permitted and forbidden conduct should
the courts hesitate to intervene.
The wordings= and legislative history" of section 57 of the
Ontario Labour Relations Act both indicate that its sponsors in-
tended (a) to forbid picketing in support of illegal strikes," and
(b) to forbid picketing directed towards employees rather than
consumers." Moreover, in passing section 57 the legislature ap-
parently declined to fully pursuers a unanimous recommendation
of the 1958 Legislative Select Committee which would have out-
lawed all picketing at the premises of a neutral employer ."? Thus,
the Hersees decision forbids picketing which contravenes neither
limb of the expressed statutory policy and makes illegal per se
what the legislature, by its silence, has declined to do .
Secondary picketing, no doubt, offends the social sensibilities
of most of us as citizens. Perhaps it should be totally prohibited ;
perhaps it should be prohibited only where it engenders difficulties
between the neutral employer and his employees. British Columbia"'
has apparently chosen the former course and Newfoundland" the
latter . In the United States an extremely delicate balance is struck
in section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Acts° to which exceptions
"= Labour Relations Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c . 202, s . 57(1). No person shall
do any act if he knows or ought to know that, as a probable and reasonable
consequence of the act, another person or persons will engage in an unlaw-
ful strike or an unlawful lock-out. (2) Sub-section l does not apply to any
act done in connection with a lawful strike or lawful lock-out .
sa (1960), 2 Ont. Legisl . Ass . Deb . a t pp . 2107-2115 .
sa See remarks of the Hon. Minister of Labour, Mr. Daley, ibid., at
p. 2110.
ss Ibid., at p. 2112.
ss Insofar as secondary picketing of the premises of a neutral employer
results in an illegal strike of neutral employees, section 57 was apparently
intended to outlaw such activity ; see the remarks of the Hon . Minister of
Labour, ibid., at p . 2108 . However, section 57(2) specifically permits such
picketing if done in connection with a lawful strike. Arguably, had the
picketing, in Hersees caused an unlawful strike of Hersees' employees,
section 57(2) would provide no exculpation because there was no strike
at Deacon Bros ., the primary employer ; see Laskin, The Ontario Labour
Relations Amendment Act, 1960 (1961-2), 14 U.T.L .3 . 116, at p . 120.
11 Report of the Select Committee on Labour Relations of the Ontario
Legislature, 1958, at p. 41 . See also Laskin, op. cit ., ibid., at pp . 119-120.
Is Trade-unions Act, R.S.B.C., 1960, c . 384, s.3(l) . Cotes Bakery v.
Bakery etc. Workers, supra, footnote 46, held that employees engaged in
a lawful strike were required to confine picketing to the "employer's place
of business," and enjoined them from elsewhere distributing handbills or
displaying placards which advised the public of the existence of the strike.as Labour Relations Act, R.S.N., 1952, c . 258, (am. S.N., 1959, c . 1),
s. 43A,
so 29 U.S.C.A ., s. 141 et seq. ; Publ. L. No . 101, 80th Cong ., 1st sess.
(1947) . In a recent case, Fruit & Vegetable Packers v . N.L.R.B. (1962),
1963] .
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have been expressly provided in section 8(e) in the light of the
recognized facts of industrial life in the -trucking and garment in-
dustries. Merely to state the legislative longitude and latitude of
secondary picketing in the United States requires some 750 carefully
chosen words-a total which almost equals the sum of reasoning
plus result in one of the Hersees judgments. .
The basic criticism of the Hersees judgment, then is not as to
the result but as to the method of reaching it. The substantive
analysis of the judgments of the Court of Appeal leaves much to
be desired. The bold judicial policymaking raises the gravest issues
of the proper relationship of court and Commons. To decide the
legality of secondary picketing in a lis inter partes involving only
the union and the neutral retailer is to ignore the complex of com-
peting interests whichmay be affected : the interest of the defendant
union and its members in asserting' economic pressure in the
primary dispute with Deacon ; the interests of members of other
unions in refraining from unwittingly giving aid and comfort to
Deacon by buying its products ; the like interest of sympathizers
who are not union members ; the interest of Deacon in maintaining
sales so as to withstand union pressure ; the interest of Hersees qua
employer in avoiding work stoppages of its employees, and qua
retailer in preserving an uninterrupted flow of custom ; the public
interest in preserving historic channels of public persuasion through
picketing, and in confining the ambit of economic warfare so as to
protect non-belligerents . Each of these interests is legitimate ; each
deserves to be weighed in the balance of public policy by those
authorized to formulate legislation.
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was sought
and refused in the Hersees case." The judgment of the Court of
Appeal thus remains, and will likely continue to remain for many
years," as a reminder that common-law litigation is a poor sub-
308 F . 2d 311 (C.A.D.C .) a sharp distinction was drawn between employee-
directed and consumer-directed picketing, and only the former was held
to fall within the prohibition of section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act .
Per Bazelon J., at p. 316 : "It should be borne in mind that this type of
`do not patronize' appeal to the general public by peaceful pickets is not
restricted to labour unions . . . . . .s' April 23rd, 1963 . Material was filed which showed that the union's
right to represent Deacon Bros. employees had been terminated on Jan .
7th, 1963, prior to the hearing of the application for leave to appeal . The
court apparently felt that this rendered the controversy moot and dis-
missed the application .
62 The Hersees case reached the Court of Appeal because the inter-
locutory proceedings, on consent, were treated as a motion for final judg-
ment on the material filed . The requirement (Judicature Act, R.S.O .,
1960 c . 197, s. 25) that leave to appeal be obtained in interlocutory pro-
ceedings has proven an almost insurmountable barrier to appellate review
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stitute for legislative debate in the resolution of deep-rooted social
controversies.
H. W. ARTHURS*
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-LABOUR RELATIONS-EMPLOYEES OF SUB-
CONTRACTOR WORKING ON PROJECTS UNDER FEDERAL .IÜRISDIC-
TION.-A recent decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in
BachmeierDiamondandPercussion Drilling Co. Ltd. v. Beaverlodge
District of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' Local Union Number
913, 1 does little toward a resolution of the continual controversy
surrounding the right of a province to legislate validly in respect of
workers labouring entirely within a province upon a project that
extends outside that province ; or upon a project which, though
located entirely within a province, is of such widespread importance
as to be declared by Parliament to be for the general advantage of
Canada.
The litigation arose by way of an application to quash an order
of the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board made on February
22nd, 1962 . The Board had ordered that all diamond drillers,
runners and helpers of the applicant (but excluding all office staff,
managerial personnel and foremen) constituted an appropriate unit
of employees for the purpose of bargaining collectively ; that the
respondent union represented a majority of the applicant's em-
ployees in this unit and that the applicant must bargain with this
unit .
The application was founded upon three contentions :
(1) that the Saskatchewan Board was without jurisdiction to
make this order under sections 91 and 92 of the British
North America Act; a
(2) that the applicant's work had been declared to be for the
general advantage of Canada pursuant to section 18 of
the Atomic Energy Control Act ; a and
(3) that the work of the applicant was covered by section 53
(g) and other provisions of the Industrial Relations and
Disputes Investigation Act.'
of labour injunction proceedings in Ontario, and no doubt explains
absence of reported cases since 1934.
*H . W. Arthurs, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto .
1 (1962), 35 D.L.R . (2d) 241 (Sask . C.A .) .
(1567), 30 & 31 Vict ., c . 3 3 R.S.C ., 1952, c . 11 .
' R .S.C ., 1952, c . 152 .
the
